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31 Introduction
The subjective expected utility model Savage formulated in 19541 has been criticized
on the basis it does not provide a good description of a decision maker's attitude
towards ambiguity. It was initially suggested by Ellsberg (1961) that the decision
maker does not behave as if he forms a unique subjective probability (or is sur-
rounded by a set of priors and ignores all but one). The same critique applies to the
alternative formulation of Anscombe and Aumann (1963). Here the independence
axiom precludes the Ellsberg-type behavior that has been observed in experimental
work.2 A broad literature has attempted to formulate models of decision making
that accommodate the Ellsberg-type behavior. A large part of this literature works
within the Anscombe-Aumann framework and weakens the independence axiom.
The majority of models of decision making (under uncertainty or not) assume
that preferences are complete in that every pair of alternatives is comparable. Such
a postulate has been criticized as being unrealistic. For instance, in an early con-
tribution to the study of incomplete preferences, Aumann (1962) argued that the
completeness axiom is an inaccurate description of reality and also hard to accept
from a normative viewpoint: \rationality" does not demand the agent to make a
denite comparison of every pair of alternatives. Mandler (2005) formalizes the last
point by showing that agents with incomplete preferences are not necessarily subject
to money-pumps, and consequently not \irrational" in some sense.
In the context of decision making under uncertainty in the Anscombe-Aumann
framework, the Knightian uncertainty model of Bewley (1986) and the recent single-
prior expected multi-utility model of Ok, Ortoleva, and Riella (2008) remain the only
ones which satisfy transitivity, monotonicity and allow for incompleteness of pref-
erences.3 Nevertheless, because both models satisfy the independence axiom, they
cannot cope with the sort of criticism initially raised by Ellsberg (1961). At the
same time, preferences that accommodate Ellsberg-type behavior such as the multi-
ple priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and the (more general) variational
preferences of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) are complete.
Our main contribution is to identify a class of preferences that is incomplete and
1Savage (1972).
2See Camerer (1995) for a survey of the experimental work testing Ellsberg's predictions.
3If we do not require the agent's preferences to be monotone, then we also have the additively
separable expected multi-utility model as another example of incomplete preferences under un-
certainty. See Ok et al. (2008) and the references therein for the details. Faro (2008) derives a
generalization of Bewley (1986) by not requiring preferences to be transitive.
4at the same time can explain the Ellsberg-type of behavior. Building on behaviorally
meaningful axioms on an enlarged domain of lotteries of Anscombe-Aumann acts,
we construct multiple selves versions of the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Mac-
cheroni et al. (2006) models. We also sketch a more general version of an incomplete
and ambiguity averse preference relation along the lines of Cerreia-Vioglio, Mac-
cheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2008) on the domain of Anscombe-Aumann
acts.
To illustrate our representation, consider for instance the standard Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) model. The decision maker entertains a \set of priors" M, and
ranks an act f according to the single utility index




In our representation the decision maker conceives a \class" M of possible sets of
priors, and prefers the act f to g i
V
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GS (g) for all M 2 M.






M2M of objectives.4 If each set M is a singleton, this is exactly
the model proposed by Bewley (1986). When the class M is a singleton, we obtain
the Gilboa-Schmeidler model. Another contribution of this paper is to show that
the canonical model of Knightian uncertainty of Bewley (1986) belongs to the same
class of incomplete preferences as the (complete) multiple priors and variational
preferences.
This paper faces two major diculties in axiomatizing the multiple selves version
of the models mentioned above. First, we do not have an answer to what happens
if one drops the completeness axiom in its entirety. Instead, we assume a weak
form of completeness by requiring that the preference relation is complete on the
subdomain of constant acts. That is, the Partial Completeness axiom of Bewley
(1986) is assumed. Second, as we have already pointed out, in most of the paper
we work with preferences dened on the domain of lotteries of acts, and not on the
4That collection of objectives arises from the multiplicity of sets of priors. Such multiplicity
seems to be as plausible as the existence of second order beliefs. For instance, they can be inter-
preted as the support of a collection of second order beliefs, and the decision maker is a pessimistic
agent which extracts a utility index from each of those beliefs by looking at the worst event (in
this case the worst prior) in the support. As an incomplete list of recent models of second order
beliefs, see Klibano, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), Nau (2006), and Seo (2007).
5standard domain of Anscombe-Aumann acts. This enlarged domain is not a novel
feature of this paper, and it was recently employed by Seo (2007). Our representation
in such a framework induces a characterization of a class of incomplete preferences
on the subdomain of Anscombe-Aumann acts whose relation to other classes of







Figure 1: Preferences satisfying partial completeness and monotonicity
In spite of using the same setup of Seo (2007), who constructs a model that
accommodates ambiguity aversion and does not assume reduction of compound ob-
jective lotteries, our model is not able to explain Halevy's (2007) ndings of a strong
empirical association between reduction of compound objective lotteries and ambi-
guity neutrality. We explicitly assume reduction of such lotteries in our axioms, and
at the same time claim that decision makers with the preferences axiomatized in
this paper are ambiguity averse provided a mild \consistency" condition among the
multiple selves holds.
Every model is false, and ours are not immune to that. Nevertheless, we do not
share the view that our models are subject to Halevy's (2007) criticisms. His exper-
iments are a valid test of his main thesis (viz. the correlation between ambiguity
neutrality and reduction of compound objective lotteries) provided his auxiliary as-
6sumptions, especially the completeness of preferences, are true. Therefore, it is not
clear whether his critique applies when preferences are incomplete. For instance, the
mechanism Halevy (2007) uses to elicit preferences from subjects is valid only under
the completeness axiom.5 To the best of our knowledge, there is no experimental
work that explores the results of Eliaz and Ok (2006) regarding choice correspon-
dences rationalized by an incomplete preference relation in order to correctly elicit
those preferences.
1.1 Ellsberg-type behavior: example
Consider the example from Ellsberg (2001) as described by Seo (2007). There is a
single urn, with 200 balls. Each ball can have one and only one of four colors: two
dierent shades of red (RI and RII), and two dierent shades of black (BI and
BII). One hundred balls are either RI or BI. Fifty of the remaining balls are RII,
and the other fty are BII. There are six alternative bets available to the decision
maker. Bet A is such that he wins if a ball of color RI is drawn. Similarly, dene
the bets B;C and D on the colors BI, RII, and BII, respectively. Also dene the
bet AB as the bet in which the decision maker wins if a ball of color RI or BI is
drawn, and the bet CD as the bet in which he wins if a ball of color RII or BII
is drawn. Finally, assume the winning prize is such that the utility of winning is 1,
and the utility of losing is 0.
In the original experiment, agents rank the bets according to: C  D  A  B,
and AB  CD. Our model can explain the case in which AB  CD, C  D  A;B,
and A and B are not comparable. Consider, for example, a Gilboa-Schmeidler
incomplete preference relation.
The state space is S := fRI;BI;RII;BIIg. The decision maker entertains































.6 That is, the decision maker is
composed of two selves. One self, associated with M1, has two extreme priors on
states: a uniform prior, and one that assigns zero probability to the event a ball of









), but is less condent about the odds of a ball of color BI: he
also contemplates a prior that attaches zero probability to the event BI is drawn.
5The very existence of certainty equivalents to bets on Halevy's (2007) urns, which the author
used to elicit preferences, hinges on the completeness assumption.
6The convex hull of any subset z of a vector space is denoted by co(z).






























where the rst component of each vector denotes the utility associated with the set
of priors M1, and the second component is associated with M2. One can check that
this ranking explains the Ellsberg-type behavior mentioned above.
1.2 Outline of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic setup. Section
3 gives a characterization of preferences represented by a multiple selves version of
the maxmin expected utility model and shows its uniqueness. In Section 4 we
characterize the multiple selves version of the variational preferences and prove a
similar uniqueness result. Section 5 discusses when those incomplete preferences are
ambiguity averse. In Section 6 we give some steps towards an axiomatization of
a more general version of an incomplete and ambiguity averse preference relation.
While Section 7 concludes the paper with additional remarks and open questions,
the Appendix contains the proofs of our main results.
2 Setup
The set X denotes a compact metric space. Let (X) be the set of Borel probability
measures on X, and endow it with any metric that induces the topology of weak
convergence. We denote by B(X) the Borel -algebra on X. Note that (X) is
a compact metric space. Let the set of states of the world be denoted by S, which
we assume to be nite. The set of Anscombe-Aumann acts is F := (X)
S, and is
endowed with the product topology (hence compact).
The decision maker has preferences < on the set of lotteries on F, that is,
< (F)  (F). The class of sets B(F) is the Borel -algebra on F. The
domain of preferences (F) is endowed with the topology of weak convergence
8(hence compact). Let the binary relation < (X)  (X) be dened as p < q
i hpi < hqi, where hri 2 F denotes the (constant) act h,7 where h(s) = r 2 (X)
for all s 2 S. That is, < is the restriction of < to the set of all constant acts. Note
that, with a slight abuse of notation, (X)  F  (F) because we can identify
each p 2 (X) with the constant act hpi, and each f 2 F with the degenerate
lottery f 2 (F).
Dene two mixture operations, one on the space of Anscombe-Aumann acts,
and the other on the space of lotteries of acts, as follows. Let the mixture oper-
ation  on F be such that, for all f;g 2 F,  2 [0;1], (f  (1   )g) 2 F is
dened as (f  (1   )g)(s)(B) = f (s)(B)+(1   )g (s)(B) for all s 2 S, and
B 2 B(X). That is, if we look at the inclusion F  (F), then (f  (1   )g)
is identied with f+(1 )g. Also dene the mixture operation + on (F) such
that, for all P;Q 2 (F),  2 [0;1], (P + (1   )Q) 2 (F) is dened as
(P + (1   )Q)(B) = P (B)+(1   )Q(B) for all B 2 B(F). Again, if we look
at the inclusion F  (F), then f + (1   )g is identied with f + (1   )g.
2.1 Remarks
The setup is the same as in Seo (2007). It ads to the standard setting a second layer
of objective uncertainty through the objective mixtures of acts. Each act f 2 F
delivers an objective lottery f (s) 2 (X) in state s, and the decision maker is
asked to make an assessment of any such act and of each possible objective lottery
P 2 (F) whose prizes are Anscombe-Aumann acts.
The timing of events is the following. In the rst stage, we run a spin with each
outcome f 2 F having (objective) probability P (f). Next, nature selects a state
s 2 S to be realized; this intermediate stage has subjective uncertainty. Finally,
in the second stage, we run another spin, conditional on the prize f from the rst
stage and independently of anything else, with each outcome event B 2 B(X)
having (objective) probability f (s)(B).
The introduction of an additional layer of objective uncertainty is not innocuous
and will play a distinct role in the axiomatization below. In particular, the way the
decision maker compares the objects f + (1   )g and f  (1   )g determines
part of the shape of his preferences. In the Anscombe-Aumann model, for instance,
the decision maker is indierent between f + (1   )g and f  (1   )g: it does
7Or, being more precise, the degenerate lottery that gives probability one to the constant act
h:
9not matter whether the randomization comes before or after the realization of the
subjective state.
The indierence of the decision maker between f +(1   )g and f (1   )g
is called \reversal of order" in the literature. In the setup of Seo (2007), ambiguity
neutrality can also be characterized in terms of reduction of compound lotteries, i.e.,
when the decision maker is indierent between the objects hpi + (1   )hqi and
hpi(1   )hqi. Such characterization relies on a dominance axiom that will not
be assumed here. This means that, whenever we assume the weak condition that the
decision maker is always indierent between hpi+(1   )hqi and hpi(1   )hqi,
this will not imply that his preferences also satisfy reversal of order.
3 Incomplete Multiple Priors Preferences
We will use the following set of axioms to characterize preferences.
Axiom A1 (Preference Relation). The binary relation < is a preorder.
Axiom A2 (First Stage Independence). For all P;Q;R 2 (F),  2 (0;1): if
P < Q; then P + (1   )R < Q + (1   )R.
Axiom A3 (Continuity). If (P n);(Qn) 2 (F)
1 are such that P n < Qn for all
n, P n ! P 2 (F), and Qn ! Q 2 (F), then P < Q.
Axiom A4 (Partial Completeness). The binary relation < is complete.
Axiom A5 (Monotonicity). For all f;g 2 F: if hf (s)i < hg (s)i for all s 2 S,
then f < g.
Axiom A6 (C-Reduction). For all f 2 F, p 2 (X),  2 (0;1): f 
(1   )hpi  f + (1   )hpi.
Axiom A7 (Strong Uncertainty Aversion). For all f;g 2 F,  2 (0;1):
f  (1   )g < f + (1   )g.
Axiom A8 (Nondegeneracy). 6= ;.
Axioms A1 and A4 are a weakening of the widespread \weak order" (complete
preorder) assumption in the literature. By relaxing the completeness requirement,
10our preferences can rationalize a wide range of behavior, including whatever choice
patterns were rationalized under the completeness axiom, plus, e.g., choice behav-
ior that violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Axiom A4 imposes a
minimum of comparability on preferences. It requires that, when facing only risk,
the decision maker's preferences are complete. This Partial Completeness axiom
is also present in Bewley (1986). It allows us to pin down a single utility index
that represents the complete preference relation < on the subdomain of objective
lotteries (constant acts).
The First Stage Independence axiom is also present in Seo (2007). It requires
the decision maker to satisfy independence when facing the objective probabilities
induced by the lotteries of acts. This requirement is standard in the literature:
whenever the individual faces objective uncertainty, it is common to impose inde-
pendence. Our Continuity axiom A3, also called \closed-continuity", is also standard
and demands that pairwise comparisons are preserved in the limit.8
Axiom A5 is the AA-Dominance of Seo (2007). He also uses a stronger dominance
axiom to obtain a second order subjective expected utility representation, and this
axiom is not assumed here. Instead, we replace his stronger dominance axiom by A6
and A7, and also relax his completeness axiom on lotteries of acts. Also note that
axioms A1-A3 and A6 imply Second Stage Independence for constant acts, that is:
for all p;q;r 2 (X),  2 (0;1), hpi < hqi i hpi(1   )hri < hqi(1   )hri.
From the original axioms of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), we only retain the
Monotonicity axiom A5 and the Nondegeneracy axiom A8 in their original formats,
and also part of their weak order axiom, which is weakened here to A1 and A4
after we drop the completeness requirement. The axioms A2 and A3 pertain to
the domain of lotteries of acts (F) and cannot be directly compared with the
Gilboa-Schmeidler axioms.
The axioms A6 and A7 together give the shape of each utility function in the
representation of < on F: they are concave, positively homogeneous, and vertically
invariant functions.9 Strong Uncertainty Aversion says that the degenerate lottery
of acts f+(1 )g is preferred to f +(1   )g. Ultimately, the rst stage mixture
f+(1   )g contains two sources of subjective uncertainty: one is the uncertainty
8Note that axioms A1-A3 imply: for all P;Q;R 2 (F),  2 (0;1): if P + (1   )R <
Q + (1   )R, then P < Q. See Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004) for an account of this fact
and a discussion of the Continuity axiom.
9A version of A6 was used by Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo (2007) under the name of \certainty
reversal of order" in the context of complete preferences over menus.
11about the payo of f, and the other about the payo of g. Therefore, axiom A7
can be interpreted as aversion to subjective uncertainty in that the decision maker
prefers (ex-ante) to face the single source of uncertainty present in f  (1   )g
than face uncertainty on both f and g in f+(1   )g. Now, both f+(1   )hpi
and f(1   )hpi have a single source of subjective uncertainty. The C-Reduction
axiom says that in this case the decision maker is indierent between those lotteries
of acts.
Theorem 1. The following are equivalent:
(a) < satises A1-A8.
(b) There exist u : (X) ! R continuous, ane, and nonconstant, and a class
M of nonempty, closed and convex subsets of the jSj 1-dimensional simplex




















for all M 2 M. In particular, for all f;g 2 F,






u(g)d for all M 2 M: (2)
If we dene UM (f) := min2M
R
u(f)d, then (1) is the Expected Multi-Utility
representation of Dubra et al. (2004) on the set of lotteries on F with fUM : M 2 Mg
being the set of utility functions on the space of prizes in their representation. The
restriction of < to the set of Anscombe-Aumann acts admits the representation in
(2). The maxmin expected utility representation of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
now becomes a special case of (2) when jMj = 1. In the event each set M 2 M is
a singleton, we obtain the Knightian uncertainty model of Bewley (1986). This is
easily done by strengthening A6 to the condition that, for all f;g 2 F,  2 (0;1):
f  (1   )g  f + (1   )g. By assuming in addition that < is complete one
obtains the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) representation.
Let M denote the class of all nonempty, closed and convex subsets of the jSj 1
dimensional simplex. The set M is endowed with the Hausdor metric dH. A pair
(u;M) that represents < is unique in the sense we establish next.
12Proposition 1. Let u;v 2 C ((X)) be ane and nonconstant, and M;N  M.
The pairs (u;M) and (v;N) represent < in the sense of Theorem 1 i u is a positive
ane transformation of v, and cldH (co(M)) = cldH (co(N)).10
4 Incomplete Variational Preferences
In deriving the incomplete preferences version of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989),
we explicitly used the C-Reduction axiom to make each U vertically invariant and
positively homogeneous. Incomplete variational preferences are more general and
only require U to be vertically invariant. This property is satised if we drop A5
and A6, and replace them by the following axioms.
Axiom A5' (C-Mixture Monotonicity). For all f;g 2 F, p;q 2 (X),  2
(0;1]: if hf (s)i + (1   )hpi < hg (s)i + (1   )hqi for all s 2 S, then f +
(1   )hpi < g + (1   )hqi.
Axiom A6' (Reduction of Lotteries). For all p;q 2 (X),  2 (0;1): hpi
(1   )hqi  hpi + (1   )hqi.
Axiom A5' is a generalization of the standard Monotonicity axiom A5. It in-
corporates A5 as a special case when  = 1. Moreover, it is not dicult to show
that, under the C-Reduction axiom A6, A5' is implied by A5. Note that A5 and
A5' are distinct forms of monotonicity. The former is the standard Monotonicity
axiom because it pertains to the domain of acts, while the latter requires some sort
of monotonicity on the domain of objective mixtures (lotteries) of acts. Axiom A6'
is a weakening of A6. Technically, axiom A6' is used to identify a single continuous
and ane utility function representing preferences on the subdomain of constant
acts.
We note in passing that axiom A5' can be replaced by the following condition:
(1
2-A.5') For all f;g 2 F, p;q 2 (X): if 1
2 hf (s)i + 1
2 hpi < 1
2 hg (s)i + 1
2 hqi for
all s 2 S, then 1
2f + 1




2-A.5') is a weaker version of axiom A5'. It can also be interpreted
as a strengthening of the uniform continuity axiom of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008)
10For any subset z of a metric space, cld (z) represents its closure relative to the metric d.
13provided the mixture (with equal weights) of a lottery hri with the certainty equiv-
alent of an act h in their framework is identied with 1
2h + 1
2 hri. Building on an
axiom along the lines of condition (1
2-A.5'), we provide in section 7 an alternative
axiomatization of the variational preferences of Maccheroni et al. (2006) that does
not require us to explicitly mention their weak c-independence axiom.
4.1 Remarks
We are after a multi-utility representation where each utility is a concave niveloid.
The term niveloid was rst introduced by Dolecki and Greco (1991, 1995). They
dene a niveloid as an isotone and vertically invariant functional in the space of
(extended) real-valued functions. They also give an alternative characterization of
a niveloid which we are about to exploit in our representation. Maccheroni et al.
(2006) mention such characterization but do not exploit it as we do here. To be
more concrete, let I : RS ! R, and consider the following property:
(P) For all ; 2 RS, I ()   I ()  maxs2S [ (s)    (s)].
Corollary 1.3 of Dolecki and Greco (1995)11 shows that I is a niveloid (in its
original sense) i I satises (P). Given a multi-utility representation U  C (F) of
< in which each U agrees with the same ane function u 2 C ((X)) on constant
acts, the following property of < implies that the preference on utility acts induced
by each U can be represented by a niveloid:
(P<) For all f;g 2 F, there exists s 2 S such that 1
2g+ 1
2 hf (s)i < 1
2f + 1
2 hg (s)i.
Proposition 2. A1, A2, A4, A5' and A6' imply (P<).
4.2 Representation
Theorem 2. The following are equivalent:
(a) < satises A1-A4, A5', A6', and A7-A8.
(b) There exist u : (X) ! R continuous, ane, and nonconstant, and a class C
of lower semicontinuous (l.s.c.), grounded12, and convex functions c : (S) !
11Also Lemma 22 of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2004) and Theorem 2.2 of Dolecki
and Greco (1991).
12That is, inf2(S) c() = 0.



















for all c 2 C. In particular, for all f;g 2 F,










for all c 2 C:
Moreover, given c 2 C, there exists a unique minimal cost function c :





, e = c;c, and c () := maxf2FfUc(f) 
R
u(f)dg,
for all  2 (S).
When each cost function c is identical to the indicator function (in the sense of
convex analysis) of some closed and convex subset M of the jSj   1 dimensional
simplex, Theorem 2 provides a characterization of an incomplete multiple priors
preference. In this case, there exists a class M of closed and convex subsets of
(S) such that C := fM : M 2 Mg, that is, for all c 2 C, c() = M () = 0 if
 2 M, and +1 if  = 2 M.
We note that each representation (u;C) of a given preference < naturaly induces
another representation (u;C) of <, where C contains the minimal cost functions
associated to each c 2 C. When C contains only minimal cost functions, or, al-
ternatively, C = C, we say that (u;C) is a representation of < with minimal cost
functions. We can now use this concept to write a uniqueness result in the spirit of
Proposition 1 for Theorem 2.
Proposition 3. Let u;v 2 C ((X)) be ane and nonconstant, and C and E be
two classes of l.s.c., grounded and convex functions c;e : (S) ! R+. The pairs
(u;C) and (v;E) are representations with minimal cost functions of < in the sense
of Theorem 2 i there exists (;) 2 R++  R such that u = v +  and
clkk1 (coepi (C)) = clkk1 (coepi (E));
where coepi (A) := fa : (S) ! R+ : epi(a) 2 co(epi(A))g, and epi(A) :=
fepi(a) : a 2 Ag, for A = C;E.13
13We denote by epi(a) the epigraph of the function a.
155 Relation to Ambiguity Aversion
Let <1 and <2 be two preference relations on F. Following Ghirardato and Mari-
nacci (2002), we say that <2 is more ambiguity averse than <1 if they induce the
same preferences on (X) and, for all p 2 (X), f 2 F, if hpi <1 f, then hpi <2 f.
We take as benchmark for an ambiguity neutral preference relation the subjective
expected utility model of Anscombe and Aumann (1963). Again following Ghi-
rardato and Marinacci (2002), we say that a relation < F F is ambiguity averse
if it is more ambiguity averse than some Anscombe-Aumann preference <.14 In
other words, < (F)  (F) is ambiguity averse if it is more ambiguity averse
than <.
Here < stands for a preference relation on F such that its restriction to (X)
can be represented by a single utility u : (X) ! R that is continuous, nonconstant,
and ane. The rst (and less general) version of our result says that the absence of
complete disagreement among the decision marker's selves about the priors on the
state space is a necessary and sucient condition for an incomplete multiple priors
preference relation to be ambiguity averse.
Proposition 4. Let <  FF be an incomplete multiple priors preference relation




In general, one can show that the incomplete variational preferences are also
ambiguity averse, so that Proposition 4 becomes a particular case of the following.
Proposition 5. Let <  F  F be an incomplete variational preference relation
represented by the pair (u;C). Then < is ambiguity averse i
T
c2C
f 2 (S) : c() =
0g 6= ;.
The nonempty intersection condition that characterizes ambiguity aversion in
our framework is related to Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki's (2008) notion of
subjective beliefs. For a given M 2 M, the priors in M are the subjective beliefs at
any constant act of one of the selves of the decision maker. For a xed c 2 C, the
set f 2 (S) : c() = 0g has the same interpretation. Therefore, the incomplete
preference relations above are ambiguity averse i the selves of the decision maker
share at least one subjective belief at any constant act.
14Alternatively, we could have taken as benchmark the single-prior expected multi-utility model
of Ok et al. (2008), but since all relations considered here satisfy Partial Completeness, the re-
quirement that the benchmark relation induce the same risk preference as the relation under study
would force it to be of the Anscombe-Aumann type anyway.
166 Towards a General Case
In this section we adapt the analysis of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008) to the case of
incomplete preferences. We depart from the setup in the previous sections in the
sense that we do not work in an environment with lotteries of acts. The reason
is inherently technical. The analysis in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008) is based on a
duality theory for monotone quasiconcave functions. The basic advantage of working
in an environment with lotteries of acts was the possibility of using the expected
multi-utility theory to derive a multi-utility representation with some particular
cardinal properties. Since quasiconcavity is an ordinal property, having an extra
layer of objective randomization in the present section would be of little use.
Formally, we consider a binary relation D on the domain of AA acts F, that
is, D F  F. Dene the binary relation D (X)  (X) by p D q i
hpi D hqi.The mixing operator + is dened so that, for all f;g 2 F,  2 [0;1],
(f + (1   )g)(s)(B) = f (s)(B)+(1   )g (s)(B) for all s 2 S, and B 2 B(X).
Consider the following set of axioms on D :
Axiom B1 (Preference Relation). The binary relation D is a preorder.
Axiom B2 (Upper Semicontinuity). For all f 2 F, the set fg 2 F : g D fg is
closed.
Axiom B3 (Convexity). For all f 2 F, the set fg 2 F : g D fg is convex.
Axiom B4 (Monotonicity). For all f 2 F: if hf (s)i D hg (s)i for all s 2 S,
then f D g.
Axiom B5 (Partial Completeness). The binary relation D is complete.
Axiom B6 (Weak Continuity). If (pn);(qn) 2 (X)
1 are such that pn D qn
for all n, pn ! p 2 (X), and qn ! q 2 (X), then p D q.
Axiom B7 (Risk Independence). For all p;q;r 2 (X),  2 (0;1): if p D q,
then p + (1   )r D q + (1   )r.
Axioms B5-B7 allow us to nd an expected utility representation for the re-
lation D. Axiom B4 is the same standard monotonicity property that was used
in the previous sections. Convexity of preferences is necessary to guarantee that
17we can represent D by a set of quasiconcave functions. In the complete case this
property is replaced by Uncertainty Aversion, but in the presence of Completeness,
Monotonicity and Continuity they are equivalent.
Finally, we ask that D satisfy only Upper Semicontinuity. As pointed out by
Evren and Ok (2007), it is fairly easy to represent an upper semicontinuous pref-
erence relation by a set of upper semicontinuous functions. However, nding a
continuous multi-utility representation is a much more demanding task. Indeed, we
do not know of conditions that make D representable by a set of continuous and
quasiconcave functions. In any event, the postulates above are enough to give us a
multiple selves version of the representation in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008).
Theorem 3. The following are equivalent:
(a) < satises B1-B7.
(b) There exist u : (X) ! R continuous and ane, and a collection G of upper
semicontinuous functions (u.s.c.) G : u((X))  (S) ! R such that:















for all G 2 G.
2. For all  2 (S), G 2 G, G(;) is increasing, and there exists H 2 G
such that inf2(X) H (;) is strictly increasing.
7 Discussion
7.1 Alternative axiomatization of variational preferences
The alternative axiomatization of the variational preferences of Maccheroni et al.
(2006) we propose is linked to the recent generalization of Cerreia-Vioglio et al.
(2008). Our goal in this alternative axiomatization is to show that one can dis-
pense with the weak c-independence axiom of Maccheroni et al. (2006), as we do in
our multiple selves version. All one needs is to replace it by independence on the
subdomain of constant acts plus a stronger monotonicity axiom.
18The setup is the same as in sections 2 and 3, except that the binary relation
3 is dened on the domain of Anscombe-Aumann acts F. The restriction of 3 to
the subdomain of constant acts is denoted by 3. A utility index U : F ! R that
represents 3 can be constructed provided the following axioms are satised.
Axiom VP1 (Nondegenerate Weak Order). The binary relation 3 is a com-
plete preorder, and 6= ;.
Axiom VP2 (Monotonicity). For all f 2 F: if f (s) 3g (s) for all s 2 S, then
f 3 g.
Axiom VP3 (Risk Independence). For all p;q;r 2 (X),  2 (0;1): if p 3 q,
then p + (1   )r 3 q + (1   )r.
Axiom VP4 (Continuity). If (fn);(gn) 2 F1 are such that fn 3 qn for all n,
fn ! f 2 F, and gn ! g 2 F, then f 3 g.
It is not dicult to check that axioms VP1-VP4 imply the existence of a non-
constant and ane function u 2 C ((X)) representing 3, the existence of a
certainty equivalent pf for every act f, and that the function U : F ! R dened
by U (f) = u(pf) represents 3. Assume w.l.o.g. that u((X)) = [ 1;1].
Identify each f 2 F with the vector of utils u(f) 2 [ 1;1]
S, and dene the
preorder v on [ 1;1]
S by u(f) = f v g = u(g) i f % g. Because IU, as dened
by IU (f) = U (f), represents v, this establishes the following lemma.
Lemma 1. There exists a nonconstant, continuous and monotonic function IU :
[ 1;1]
S ! R that represents v. Moreover, IU (a1S) = a for all a 2 [ 1;1].
Two additional axioms are needed. One is the standard Uncertainty Aversion
axiom, and the other is a strengthening of the \uniform continuity" axiom of Cerreia-
Vioglio et al. (2008).15 We refer to our last axiom as \1
2-c-mixture monotonicity*"
because of its similarity with axiom A5'.
Axiom VP5 (Uncertainty Aversion). For all f;g 2 F,  2 (0;1): if f  g,
then f + (1   )g 3 f.
15Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008) make use of an object (viz. the certainty equivalent of an act)
that is not a primitive of the model to write that axiom. We avoid this issue here by adding one
additional quantier to our axiom VP6.
19Axiom VP6 (1
2-C-Mixture Monotonicity*). For all f;g 2 F, p;q 2 (X):
if 1
2f (s) + 1
2p 3 1
2g (s) + 1





rf;rg 2 (X) such that f  rf and g  rg.
Axiom VP6 implies that IU is a niveloid, that is, for all f;g 2 [ 1;1]
S, I (f) 
I (g)  maxs2S [f (s)   g (s)]. To see this, note that all we need is to show that
the following property holds:
(P) For all f;g 2 F, there exists s 2 S such that 1
2pg + 1
2f (s) 3 1
2pf + 1
2g (s).
The proof that P actually holds is an easy consequence of the representation
obtained so far and axiom VP6. Lemma 20 of Maccheroni et al. (2004) guarantees
that (using VP5) IU is in fact a concave niveloid. Therefore, using the same argument
as in the last paragraph of the proof of Theorem 2, we can show that 3 has a
variational preference representation. The converse of the statement can be checked
through standard arguments. Finally, note that one could have replaced VP6 by an
axiom similar to C-Mixture Monotonicity if we replace the weight 1
2 by some generic
 2 (0;1], and assume the statement of the axiom is true for all  2 (0;1].
7.2 Open questions
We are mainly interested in the incomplete preference relation dened on the do-
main of Anscombe-Aumann acts. It is not clear, though, how to provide a direct
axiomatization for preferences dened on such domain. Bewley (1986) and Ok et al.
(2008) provided axiomatizations on such domain. In their cases, independence holds,
and one can employ the technique of nding a set of utility functions by looking at
the linear functionals which support the Aumann cone at the origin. Without the
independence axiom, it is not clear how to provide a generalization of their theorems
using the original domain.
A better understanding of general ambiguity averse preferences is also missing
in this paper. Although we managed to sketch a representation in the format of
Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008) in section 6, we had to work with a multi-utility rep-
resentation with functions that were only upper semicontinuous. A closer multiple
selves generalization of the result in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008) would obtain a
multi-utility representation U  C (F) and at the same time guarantee that each
U 2 U was quasiconcave and continuous. The existence of the set U is not a problem
(e.g., Evren and Ok (2007)), but we were not able to show that each U 2 U can be
20made quasiconcave and continuous at the same time.16,17
Finally, we conjecture that, provided we work with simple acts, our represen-
tations above (including section 6) would go through if we assume a general state
space S (not necessarily nite), and that the set of consequences is a convex and
compact metric space. We did not pursue such a path here because it would not
add much to our understanding of incomplete and ambiguity averse preferences.
A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of the direction (b))(a) is standard, and thus omitted. We now prove
(a))(b).
Claim A.1.1. There exists a closed and convex set U  C (F) such that, for all




F UdQ for all U 2 U.
Proof of Claim A.1.1. Because F is a compact metric space, (F) is endowed with
the topology of weak convergence, and < satises A1-A3, the Expected Multi-Utility
Theorem of Dubra et al. (2004) applies.
Claim A.1.2. There exists an ane, continuous and nonconstant function u :
(X) ! R such that, for all p;q 2 (X), p < q i u(p)  u(q).
Proof of Claim A.1.2. The binary relation < is a preorder on (X). One can
verify A3 implies that < is closed-continuous. Moreover, it is complete by A4.
Now use A2, A3, and A6 to obtain that, for all p;q;r 2 (X),  2 (0;1), p < q
i hpi < hqi i hpi  (1   )hri  hpi + (1   )hri < hqi + (1   )hri 
hpi  (1   )hri i p + (1   )r < q + (1   )r. Therefore, < satises all
the assumptions of the Expected Utility Theorem, and it can be represented by an
ane and nonconstant function u 2 C((X)). Moreover, using A5 and A8 one can
show u is nonconstant.18
16In particular, if the set U were compact and the function e : F ! C (U) as dened by
e(f)(u) = u(f) were K-quasiconcave in the sense of Benoist, Borwein, and Popovici (2002), one
could have applied their theorem 3.1. We were not successful in establishing those two properties.
17A general problem is that convex incomplete preferences may admit multi-utility representa-
tions with some functions that fail to be quasiconcave.
18For any compact subset z of a normed vector space, C (z) stands for the set of continuous
functions on z, and is endowed with the sup norm.
21The set U may contain constant functions. They are not essential to the rep-
resentation and can be discarded at this point. Therefore, assume w.l.o.g. that U
contains only nonconstant functions. By axiom A8, U 6= ;.
We can employ standard arguments to prove the existence of x;x 2 X such
that hxi  hxi, and hxi < hpi < hxi for all p 2 (X). Moreover, because
of C-Reduction, Continuity, Partial Completeness and Independence over lotteries,
it can also be shown that, for all p 2 (X), there exists p 2 [0;1] such that
hpi  p hxi  (1   p)hxi. The implication hpi  hqi ) p > q is also true.
Fix any U 2 U, and use Monotonicity to show that U (hxi) > U (hxi). As a
consequence, whenever hpi  hqi, it is false that U (hpi) = U (hqi). If this equality
were true, then using axiom A6 and Independence on the subdomain of constant
acts we obtain
U (hpi) = p (U (hxi)   U (hxi)) + U (hxi)
= q (U (hxi)   U (hxi)) + U (hxi) = U (hqi),
implying (p   q)(U (hxi)   U (hxi)) = 0. Because of U (hxi) > U (hxi), we
have p = q, a contradiction. Conclusion: for any xed U 2 U, Uj(X) is ane and
represents <.
Claim A.1.3. Each U 2 U can be normalized so that Uj(X) = u.
Proof of Claim A.1.3. Fix any U 2 U. Because < is complete, for all p;q 2 (X),
p < q i U (hpi)  U (hqi). Therefore, Uj(X) and u are both ane representations
of <. By cardinal uniqueness, we know there exists (U;U) 2 R++  R such that
Uj(X) = Uu + U.
Because (X) is weak* compact and u is continuous, there exist p;p 2 (X)




for all p 2 (X). By A5 and A8 it must be that p 6=




=  1. Then u((X)) = [ 1;1]
(use Second Stage Independence for constant acts). Given p 2 (X), it follows from
our normalization of U in the previous step that U (hpi) = u(p). Therefore, for all
f 2 F, let f := uf 2 [ 1;1]
S. Let the functional IU : [ 1;1]
S ! R be dened by
IU (f) = U (f), for all f 2 [ 1;1]
S (A5 guarantees that IU is well-dened).
Claim A.1.4. IU is positively homogeneous.
Proof of Claim A.1.4. Take any U 2 U. Let p0 2 (X) be such that u(p0) = 0.
Let f 2 [ 1;1]
S,  2 (0;1). Axiom A6 implies f(1   )hp0i  f+(1   )hp0i,
22and hence IU (f) = U (f + (1   )hp0i) = U (f) + (1   )U (hp0i) = IU (f).
If  > 1 and f 2 [ 1;1]





i IU (f) = IU (f)
(because 1
 < 1).
Using an argument similar to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), we extend IU to RS
(call this extension I
U): for all  2 RS, let I
U () = 1
I
U (), for all  > 0 such that
 2 [ 1;1]
S. Standard arguments can be employed to show the extension does not
depend on which  is used to shrink  towards the origin.
Claim A.1.5. I
U is increasing, positively homogenous, superadditive, C-additive,
and normalized.
Proof of Claim A.1.5. Let ;0 2 RS, and  > 0 be such that ;0 2 [ 1;1]
S
and   0. Then   0, and by A5 we obtain that IU () = U (f) 
U (f0) = IU (0), where f and f0 are the acts associated with  and 0, re-
spectively. Hence I
U ()  I
U (0), and I
U is increasing. It is not dicult to verify I
U










































Using positive homogeneity of I
U we conclude that I
U ( + 0)  I
U () + I
U (0),
and I










S (with abuse of notation, we write a instead of















2U (hpai) = 1
2IU () + 1
2IU (a), where u  f =  and u(pa) = a, with
f;hpai 2 F. Therefore, using positive homogeneity we obtain I
U ( + a) =
I
U () + I
U (a), and I
U is C-additive. It is clear that I
U is normalized, that is,
I
U (1) = 1.
Because, given any U 2 U, I
U satises all the properties proved in the previous
step, we can write I
U () = min2MU
R
d for all  2 RS, where MU is a closed
and convex subset of the jSj   1-dimensional simplex (see Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989)). Therefore, for all f 2 F, U (f) = I
U (u  f) = min2MU
R
u(f)d. Now
dene M := fMU : U 2 Ug, and note that the pair (u;M) induces the desired
representation of < on (F).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of the \if" part is trivial and thus omitted. Let U;V  C (F) be two
representations of < induced, respectively, by the pairs (u;M) and (v;N). Because
23both u and v represent <, from the cardinal uniqueness of such a representation
it follows that u is a positive ane transformation of v. Also note that, from the
uniqueness of the expected multi-utility representation of Dubra et al. (2004), it
follows that clkk1 (cone(U) + f1F :  2 Rg) = clkk1 (cone(V) + f1F :  2 Rg).19
Now we prove two claims, which remain true if we replace U by V in their statements.
Claim A.2.1. For any nonconstant U 2 cone(U) + f1F :  2 Rg, it is possible
to nd (Ui)
n




(u(f) + )d, for all f 2 F, where, for all i 2 f1;:::;ng, Ui (f) =
min2MUi
R
u(f)d, for all f 2 F.
Proof of Claim A.2.1. By denition, there exist (Ui)
n





and  2 R such that U =
Pn
i=1 
iUi + , and then U = 
Pn




i and i =

i
 for all i 2 f1;:::;ng. Because every Ui can be written
as Ui (f) =  MUi ( u(f)), where MUi stands for the support function of MUi, it
follows that U (f) = minn
i=1iMUi
R
u(f)d+ (see, e.g., section 5.19 of Aliprantis
and Border (1999)).
Claim A.2.2. For any nonconstant U 2 clkk1 (cone(U) + f1F :  2 Rg), there




Proof of Claim A.2.2. We can take (Un) 2 (cone(U) + f1F :  2 Rg)
1, where each
Un is nonconstant w.l.o.g., and such that Un ! U. For all n 2 N, f 2 F, Un (f) =
n ( Mn ( u(f)))+n. Let p;q 2 (X) be such that u(p) > u(q). Because (Un)
also converges pointwise, limn [nu(p) + n] = U (hpi) and limn [nu(q) + n] =
U (hqi), which implies limn n [u(p)   u(q)] = U (hpi)   U (hqi). Hence n !  
0, and indeed  > 0 because U is nonconstant. Therefore n ! , for some
 2 R. Now use the fact M is compact to obtain a convergent subsequence (Mnk),
and clearly Mnk !dH M 2 cldH (co(M)). Each Mn is a real-valued function on
u((X))




converges uniformly to M.20
From claims A.2.1 and A.2.2, it follows that cl(cone(U) + f1F :  2 Rg) =
fU 2 C (F) : U (f) = min2M
R
(u(f) + )d,   0,  2 R, M 2 cldH (co(M))g,
where a similar equality holds if U is replaced by V. Now use the uniqueness re-
sults of Dubra et al. (2004) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to conclude that
cldH (co(M)) = cldH (co(N)).
19For any subset z of a vector space, cone(z) is the smallest convex cone which contains z.
20This last part follows from Hirirart-Urruty and Lemarechal (2001, Corollary 3.3.8, p.156)
24A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Claim A.3.1. Fix any f;g 2 F . There exists s 2 S such that 1
2 hg (s)i +
1
2 hf (s)i < 1
2 hf (s)i + 1
2 hg (s)i for all s 2 S.
Proof of Claim A.3.1. Assume by way of contradiction this is not the case. Then,







































Let l > 1 be the smallest integer to satisfy snl+1 2 fsn1;:::;snlg. Then snl+1 = snk






















where Nl;k := 2(l + 1   k) and the summation symbol
P
operates w.r.t. the mix-
ture operation \+". This contradicts re
exivity as the lotteries of acts on both sides
are the same.
Now use A5' to obtain 1
2g + 1
2 hf (s)i < 1
2f + 1
2 hg (s)i.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of the direction (b))(a) is standard, and thus omitted. We now prove
(a))(b).
Use claims A.1.1, A.1.2 and A.1.3 to obtain a set U  C (F) such that, for all




F UdQ for all U 2 U, and each U satises
Uj(X) = u, for some ane u 2 C ((X)) with u((X)) = [ 1;1]. For all U, let
the functional IU : [ 1;1]
S ! R be dened as IU (f) = U (f).
Take any U 2 U, f;g 2 [ 1;1]
S. Using A1, A2, A4, A5' and A6', Proposition
2 implies the existence of s 2 S such that 1
2IU (g) + 1
2f (s)  1
2IU (f) + 1
2g (s),
which is the case i IU (f) IU (g)  maxs2S [f (s)   g (s)]. Moreover, A7 implies
25that for all f;g 2 F,  2 (0;1), IU(f + (1   )g)  IU (f) + (1   )IU (g).
Therefore IU is a concave niveloid. Moreover, for any a 2 [ 1;1], we have, for some
p 2 (X), IU (a) = U (hpi) = u(hpi) = a. Hence IU is also normalized.
By putting together Lemma 24, Corollary 28 and Remark 3 of Maccheroni et al.
(2004), we obtain that, for all U 2 U, there exists a l.s.c., grounded and convex
function cU :  ! R+ such that, for all f, IU (f) = min2
R
fd + cU ()

.
Dene C := fcU : U 2 Ug, and note that the pair (u;C) yields the desired repre-
sentation of < on (F). The proof that, for each cU, there exists a minimal c
U
dened as c
U () :=  minf2F
R
u(f)d   U (f)
	
is a consequence of Lemma 27
of Maccheroni et al. (2004).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of the \if" part is trivial and thus omitted. Let U;V  C (F) be two
representations of < induced, respectively, by the pairs (u;C) and (v;E) with mininal
cost functions. Therefore, Uj(X) = u and V j(X) = v for all (U;V ) 2 U  V. (In
this case we say that U and V are normalized.)




2 R++  R and a nonconstant V 2 co(V) such that V = V + .
Proof of Claim A.5.1. For some n 2 N, there exist  2 Rn
+nf0g, V1;:::;Vn 2 V, and
 2 R such that V =
Pn
i=1 iVi + . Now dene  :=
Pn
i=1 i > 0 and  := , and
note that V = V + , where V := 1
V 2 co(V) is nonconstant.





2 R++R and a nonconstant V 2 clkk1 (co(V)) such that V = V +.
Proof of Claim A.5.2. Let (Vn) 2 (cone(V) + f1F :  2 Rg)
1 be such that Vn !




2 R++  R and
V n 2 co(V). Let p;q 2 (X) be such v (p) > v (q), and note that Vn ! V implies
that Vn (hpi) Vn (hqi) ! V (hpi) V (hqi), which is equivalent to n [v (p)   v (q)] !
V (hpi)   V (hqi). Therefore, there exists   0 such that n ! . Because V is
nonconstant, we have  > 0. Using the fact that nv (p)+n ! V (hpi), we conclude
that n ! , for some  2 R. Conclusion: V = limn
 
nV n + n

= V + , and
V is nonconstant.
Claim A.5.3. If U;V  C (F) are normalized, then they represent < i there exists





26Proof of Claim A.5.3. The proof of the \if" part is trivial and thus omitted. Now
assume that U;V  C (F) are normalized representations of <. It follows from the
uniqueness theorem of Dubra et al. (2004) that clkk1 (cone(U) + f1F :  2 Rg) =
clkk1 (cone(V) + f1F :  2 Rg). The (cardinal) uniqueness of the standard Ex-
pected Utility theorem implies the existence of (;) 2 R++  R such that, for
all (U;V ) 2 U  V, Uj(X) = V j(X) + . Pick any U 2 clkk1 (co(U)), so that
U 2 clkk1 (cone(V) + f1F :  2 Rg). Since U is normalized and < is nontriv-





R++  R and a nonconstant V 2 clkk1 (co(V)) such that U = V + . Because










+   clkk1 (co(U)).





for all f 2 F. Similarly dene functions Ve. We note that the collections U := fUc :
c 2 Cg and V := fVe : e 2 Eg are both normalized expected multi-utility represen-
tations of <. By Claim 3, there exists (;) 2 R++  R such that clkk1 (co(U)) =
clkk1 (co(V)) + .
Claim A.5.4. co(U) = fUc : epi(c) 2 coepi (C)g, and each cost function c 2 coepi (C)
is minimal for some Uc 2 co(U).




. For each c 2
C, dene Ic : [a;b]
S ! R by






for all  2 [a;b]. Let I := fIc : c 2 Cg. We note that in order to prove the claim it is
enough to show that co(I) = fIc : c 2 epi(c)g. Now, x I;J 2 I and let cI;cJ 2 C
be the cost functions in the denition of I and J. Put L := I +(1   )J, for some
 2 (0;1), and dene cL such that













d + cL ()

, for all  2 [a;b]
S .
27Let c be the function that satises epi(c) = epi(cI) + (1   )epi(cJ). We want
to prove that cL = c.
Following Maccheroni et al. (2004), for A = I;J;L, we extend A to [a;b]
S + R
using vertical invariance of A. Call this extension e A. Now, we further extend A to
RS by
b A() = max

 2 R : 9~  2 [a;b]







Lemma 24 of Maccheroni et al. (2004) shows that b A is the minimum niveloid that
extends A to RS. For each  2 RS, dene e  such that




fsg + (b   a)

:
Note that   e  and that e  2 [a;b]
S + R. Moreover,    e A(e )  e    e A(e ) and
e A(e   e A(e )) = A(e ) A(e ) = 0. For any " > 0 and  2 [a;b]
S+R, if   e A(e ) "  ,
then e    e A(e )  . Therefore b A() = e A(e ), for A = I;J;L.
Now we show that b L = b I +(1   ) b J. First note that for all (;) 2 [a;b]
S R,
e L( + ) = L() + 
= (I () + ) + (1   )(J () + )
= e I ( + ) + (1   ) e J ( + ):
Using the fact b A() = e A(e ) for all  2 [a;b]
S, A = I;J;L, we obtain












= b I () + (1   ) b J ():
From Lemma 27 of Maccheroni et al. (2004), we know that cA, for A = I;J;L is
the unique l.s.c. and convex function such that
b A() = min
2(S)
Z
d + cA ()

, for all  2 R
S.
28It can be easily checked that
b I () + (1   ) b J () = min
2(S)
Z
d + c ()

, for all  2 R
S.
Conclusion: cL = c. A simple inductive argument completes the proof of the
claim.
Claim A.5.5. clkk1 (co(U)) =
n
Uc : c 2 clkk1 (coepi (C))
o
, and each cost function
c 2 clkk1 (coepi (C)) is minimal for some Uc 2 clkk1 (co(U)).
Proof of Claim A.5.5. By the previous claim, co(U) = fUc : c 2 coepi (C)g and all
c 2 coepi (C) are minimal, so it is enough to show that for any sequence (cn) 2
(coepi (C))
1, cn ! c if and only if Ucn ! Uc and c is the minimal cost function
associated to Uc. Suppose that Ucn ! Uc, where c is the minimal cost function
associated to Uc. Fix " > 0. There exists N 2 N such that, for all f 2 F,











Fix some  2 (S), and let fc and ffng
1
n=1 be the maximizers associated to c()
and fcng
1
n=1, respectively, in the expression above. We note that, for all n > N,
Uc (fc) Ucn (fc) < ". This implies that, for all n > N, cn () > c() ". Similarly,
for all n > N, Ucn (fn)   Uc (fn) < ". Again, this implies that, for all n > N,
c() > cn ()   ". We conclude that, for all n > N, jc()   cn ()j < ". Since 
is arbitrary, (cn) converges uniformly to c. We can perform a similar analysis using
the fact that for each c,





to show that uniform convergence of the functions (cn) implies uniform convergence
of the functions Ucn. By what we have proved before this will, in turn, imply that
c is minimal, which completes the proof of the claim.
To complete the proof of the proposition, we simply observe that for any U
with variational representation (u;c), for all (;) 2 R++  R, the variational
representation of U +  is (u + ;c).
29A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Assume that there exists some  2
T
c2C
Mc, where Mc := f 2 (S) : c() = 0g. If
(p;f) 2 (X)F is such that u(p) 
R











Mc = ;, and assume w.l.o.g. that u((X)) = [ 1;1]. For
all " > 0, dene M"













c 6= ; for all " > 0. Then for all n 2 N
there exists n 2 (S) such that c(n)  1
n for all c 2 C. Use compactness of (S)
to extract a subsequence (nk) such that nk ! ~  for some ~  2 (S). For any xed
c 2 C we use the l.s.c. of c to obtain c(~ )  liminf c(nk)  liminf 1










Fix any  and note that  = 2 M"
^ c for some ^ c 2 C. Because ^ c is convex and l.s.c., the
nonempty set M"
^ c is closed and convex. Using the Separating Hyperplane Theorem





ufd^  for all ^  2 M"




  < "
3 for all  2 (S).
Now pick p 2 (X) such that u(p) =
R
ufd and note that, by construction,
u(p) <
R
ufd^  + c(^ ) for all ^  2 M"






where in the last inequality we used the fact M"
^ c is compact. For all  2 (X)nM"
^ c




ufd+c(). As a consequence, since (S) is compact,




. Let f 2 F be such that u(f) =
uf, and < be the Anscombe-Aumann preference relation induced by the pair (u;).
Therefore hpi  f, but :hpi < f. Because  was arbitrary, this implies < is not
ambiguity averse.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 3
Claim A.7.1. Let a;b 2 R, b > a, and V : [a;b]
S ! R. The following are equivalent:
(i) V is increasing, u.s.c., and quasiconcave.
30(ii) There exists an u.s.c. function G : [a;b]  (S) ! R such that, for all  2
[a;b]
S,







and, for all  2 (S), G(;) is increasing.
Proof of Claim A.7.1. (i))(ii). Dene e V : RS ! R[f 1g by e V () := supfV () :
 2 [a;b]
S and   g. It can be checked that e V is an increasing, u.s.c., and
quasiconcave extension of V . Now dene the function e V : R  (S) ! R [ f 1g
as e G(r;) := sup2RSfe V () :
R
d  rg. By construction, for any xed  2 RS,













 e V (). Otherwise, there
exists  " > 0 such that  " := f 2 RS : e V ()  e V () + "g 6= ; for all " 2 (0;  "].
Because  " is closed and convex, and  = 2  ", by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem




dq for all  2  ". Since e V is
increasing, q 2 RS








 e V () + " and,




 e V () + ". Since " 2 (0;  "] was arbitrary, we








for all  2 RS.
Now let  2 R be such that A := f(r;) 2 R  (S) : e G(r;)  g 6= ;.
Let (rn;n) 2 A1 satisfy (rn;n) ! (r;). For all n, pick n 2 [a;b]
S such that
R
ndn  rn and e V (n)  e V (). The existence of n follows from the way e V and
e G were constructed. Note that, we can assume w.l.o.g. that n ! , by passing to
a subsequence if necessary. Clearly,
R
d  r, so that e G(r;)  e V (). Because
e V (n)   for all n, and e V is u.s.c., we conclude that e V ()  , implying that
e G(r;)  . Therefore e G is u.s.c.. It is also increasing in the rst argument, as it can




for all  2 [a;b]
S.
(ii))(i). Let ; 2 [a;b]









, where the last inequality follows from the fact G(;)




= V (), and V must be








































d;)  minfV ();V ()g,
implying V is quasiconcave. Finally, let  2 R be such that B := f 2 [a;b]
S :
V ()  g 6= ;, and take a sequence (n) 2 B1 such that n ! . By construction,
G(
R





 , and hence V ()  .
Claim A.7.2. Every upper semicontinuous and convex preorder can be represented
by a set of upper semicontinuous and quasiconcave utility functions.
Proof of Claim A.7.2. Adapt the arguments of Evren and Ok (2007) and Kochov
(2007). (The representation is induced by the set of indicator functions of the upper
contour sets of all elements on the domain of preferences.)
(a))(b). Standard arguments can be employed to show the existence of a con-
tinuous and ane function u : (X) ! R such that, for all p;q 2 (X), p D q i
u(p)  u(q). Now every act f 2 F can mapped into a vector of utils f := u(f) 2
u((X))
S. We can also dene a binary relation % u((X))
S  u((X))
S so
that, for all f;g 2 u((X))
S, f % g i f D g. The monotonicity axiom B4
guarantees % is well-dened. It is easy to see that % is a monotonic preorder. Now
take any sequence (fn) in u((X))
S such that fn % g for all n 2 N, some g 2 F
, and fn ! . Because F is a compact metric space, we may assume, by passing
to a subsequence if necessary, that fn ! f, for some f 2 F . As a consequence,
using the continuity axiom B2, we conclude  = f % g. Therefore % is upper
semicontinuous. It is a standard exercise to show % is also convex. Now apply claim
A.7.2 to nd a set V of u.s.c. and quasiconcave function such that, for all f;g 2 F,
f D g i f % g i V (f)  V (g) for all V 2 V. Monotonicity of % implies each
V 2 V must be increasing.
For all c 2 u((X)), let Vc denote the function in V which takes the value 1
when evaluated at f with f % c1S, and 0 otherwise. Consider the enumeration





32Because W is the uniform limit of a sequence of u.s.c. functions, it is itself a u.s.c.









2i > 0. Let  2 (0;1], and f;g 2 F be such that W (f)   and
W (g)  . Note Wj (f)     "j and Wj (g)     "j. For some j such that
   "j > 0, put d
j :=
n








j is well-dened. Because Wj (f)   "j, we must have f % d
j1S, for otherwise
:f % d
j1S implies Vd (f) = 0 for all d  d
j. As a consequence, in order to




2iVdi (d)     "j for some d < d
j, a
contradiction with the denition of d
j. A similar argument can be employed to show
g % d
j1S. Because % is convex, for all  2 (0;1), we have f + (1   )f % d
j1S,















If we let j ! 1, we obtain W (f + (1   )f)  . Therefore, W is quasiconcave.
Also note that, for all c;d 2 u((X)), c  d i W (c)  W (d). Moreover, we can
consider V [fWg instead of V, and inf2(X) H (;) is strictly increasing for all
 2 (S), where H : u((X))  (S) ! R is dened as in the proof of claim
A.7.1.
(b))(a). First note that, for all p;q 2 (X), p D q i u(p)  u(q). Clearly
u(p)  u(q) implies G(u(p);)  G(u(q);). As a consequence inf2(S) G(u(p)); 
inf2(S) G(u(q);) and p D q. Now assume u(p) > u(q), then inf2(S) H(u(p);) >
inf2(S) H(u(q);), and inf2(S) G(u(p);)  inf2(S) G(u(q);) for all other
G 2 G. This implies p B q. Therefore, u is an expected utility representation
of D, and D must satisfy B5-B7. Second, let (fn) 2 F1 be such that fn < g 2 F









. As the pointwise inmum of a family of u.s.c. functions,



























Therefore, < is u.s.c. Third, let f;g < h,  2 (0;1), and G 2 G. Because G(;)












































G 2 G was arbitrary, then f + (1   )g < h, and < must be convex. Finally,













for all G 2 G.
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